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state and starts rapid economic growth. One is the shift of production, employment, and
consumption from the traditional sector to the modern sector, and the other is a large increase
in educational levels of its population. The question is why some economies have succeeded
in such structural change, but others do not. In order to examine the question, an OLG
model that explicitly takes into account the sectoral shift and human capital accumulation as
sources of development is constructed. It is shown that, for a successful structural change, an
economy must start with a wealth distribution that gives rise to an adequate size of 'middle
class'. Once the economy initiates the 'take-o®', the sectoral shift and human capital growth
continue until it reaches the steady state with high income and equal distribution. However,
when the productivity of the traditional sector is low, irrespective of the initial distribution and
the productivity of the modern sector, it fails in the sectoral shift and ends up in one of steady
states with low income and high inequality. Thus, su±cient productivity of the traditional
sector is a prerequisite for development.
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1 Introduction
There are two phenomena widely observed when an economy departs from an underdeveloped state
and starts rapid economic growth. One is the shift of production, employment, and consumption
from the traditional sector, such as traditional agriculture in rural areas and the urban informal
sector, to the modern sector, such as modern manufacturing and commercial agriculture. The other
is a large increase in educational levels of its population.1 Because the modern sector requires a
larger pool of skilled labor, it is easy to see that these phenomena are related. The question is why
some economies have succeeded in such `structural change', but others do not. In order to tackle
the question, particularly regarding contemporary developing economies, this paper constructs an
OLG model that explicitly takes into account the sectoral change and human capital accumulation
as sources of development.
It is shown that, for a successful structural change, an economy must start with a wealth
distribution that gives rise to an adequate size of 'middle class'. Once the economy initiates the
'take-o®', the sectoral shift and human capital growth continue until it reaches the steady state
with high income and equal distribution. However, when the productivity of the traditional sector
is low, irrespective of the initial distribution and the productivity of the modern sector, it fails in
the sectoral shift and ends up in one of steady states with low income and high inequality. Thus,
su±cient productivity of the traditional sector is a prerequisite for development.
The model economy has two sectors, traditional and modern, each producing a di®erent kind of
¯nal good. The traditional sector hires unskilled labor and the modern sector employs skilled labor
and physical capital to produce the goods.2 The market of the good produced in the traditional
sector is closed domestically,3 while the market of the good produced in the modern sector, which
is also used as a capital good, and the factor market of physical capital are open internationally.4
An agent in the economy lives for two periods. In childhood, she receives a transfer from the
parent and allocates it between two investment opportunities, assets and education, in order to
maximize future income. The investment in education is required to become a skilled worker and
is individually pro¯table, although it is costly. The cost of education is the cost of hiring skilled
workers as teachers. Since loan markets are nonexistent, tuition must be self-¯nanced. Conse-
1Empirical facts on the sectoral shift are summarized in Syrquin (1988) and those on the education growth are
surveyed in Schultz (1988).
2This assumption is made for simplicity. As long as the modern sector is more intensive in skilled labor, main
results remain unchanged.
3The traditional sector corresponds to traditional agriculture and the urban informal sector in a real economy,
which can be considered as nontradable sectors. See Section 2.3 for more detailed explanations.
4Perfect mobility of physical capital is assumed, mainly because it is more realistic than the other extreme of the
closed market as a description of the situation of contemporary developing economies. By contrast, earlier theoretical
attempts in development economics such as Lewis (1954) concern the problem of physical capital accumulation in
industrialization of a low-income economy.
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quently, poor parents cannot make investments in educating their children despite its pro¯tability,
hence the investment decisions are a®ected by family income. In adulthood, the agent has a single
child, earns income from work and assets, and spends on the consumption of the two goods and
the intergenerational transfer.
The initial situation is that a large portion of the population is in the traditional sector and
remains unskilled. Because there is little room left for growth in the traditional sector, in order to
raise the standard of living signi¯cantly, the economy must accomplish the relocation of resources
from the traditional sector to the modern sector. More individuals must be educated, but many
of them are credit constrained and cannot make optimal investments. Under what conditions can
such economy succeed?
A part of the answer is that, as mentioned earlier, the economy must start with an initial
wealth distribution that gives rise to an adequate size of 'middle class' (those who have enough
wealth to take education). The requirement for the 'take-o®' is that a portion of unskilled workers
accumulates wealth su±cient for their children to take education and get skilled jobs in the modern
sector. The source of labor income of unskilled workers is sales of the good produced in the
traditional sector. Its relative price in turn depends positively on the number of skilled workers
and aggregate assets: a higher number of skilled workers implies higher demand and lower supply
of the good, and greater wealth leads to the higher demand. Thus, for the sectoral shift to start,
the size of 'middle class' and aggregate assets must be above certain levels.
If the initial wealth distribution is such that a relatively large portion of the population has
access to education and becomes skilled workers, the price of the traditional good and thus the
unskilled wage are high. If the price level is above the critical level, a richer portion of unskilled
workers can send their children to school and the sectoral shift starts immediately. Even when the
initial price level is not high enough for the shift due to modest aggregate assets, the relatively
large pool of skilled workers makes rapid wealth accumulation possible, hence the price level rises
to the critical level at some point and the economy 'take o®s'. Once the sectoral change starts, it
continues autonomously. An increase in the number of skilled workers raises the demand for the
good, reduces its supply, and stimulates asset accumulation. All contribute to further increases in
the price of the good and the unskilled wage. This allows children of less a²uent unskilled workers
to access education and thus increases the number of skilled workers further, lifting the price and
the unskilled wage even more. As long as the skilled wage (net of the cost of education) is higher
than the unskilled wage, this process continues. In the long run, the economy reaches the state
in which the return from education is equated with that from assets, thus equal opportunity is
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attained.5
In contrast, if the economy starts with a relatively small size of 'middle class', the number of
skilled workers is limited, hence the price of the traditional good is low. Children of unskilled
workers are not able to access education ¯nancially and the number of skilled workers does not
increase. If initial wealth is low, the relative price increases over time through wealth accumulation
but never reaches the critical level for the sectoral shift. Because skilled labor remains scarce,
even in the long run, inequality between skilled and unskilled workers does not disappear and the
investment choices are a®ected by family income.
However, a 'good' initial wealth distribution is not su±cient for the success when there is the
sectoral shift of consumption, i.e. preferences are such that the income (and price) elasticity of
demand for the traditional good is less than one, while those for the modern good and the transfer
are more than one. If the productivity of the traditional sector is low, the economy ends up in a
steady state with persistent inequality irrespective of the initial distribution and the productivity
of the modern sector. Thus, su±cient productivity of the traditional sector is a prerequisite for
the successful development. Because the price elasticity of the traditional good is less than one,
when the productivity of the sector is lower, its price becomes higher more than proportionately
and the unskilled wage rises. The resultant lower return from education implies that the economy
can sustain fewer skilled workers and lower aggregate assets. If the productivity is below a certain
level, the sustainable skilled labor and aggregate assets become smaller than the levels required for
the 'take-o®' and thus the sectoral shift does not start.
The argument so far has assumed time-invariant productivities for the both sectors. The above
results are not largely a®ected by the introduction of productivity growth, as long as the cost of
education increases with the skilled wage. An economy starting with an unproductive traditional
sector is still unlikely to succeed in the structural change, irrespective of initial wealth distribution
and modern sector productivity. A new possibility is that an economy initially experiencing sectoral
shift may end up in a steady state with moderate income and high inequality, if wealth is relatively
concentrated in the rich.
The paper has several policy implications. The most important one would be that, when the
productivity of the traditional sector is low, policies enhancing the productivity and those correcting
wealth inequality (or lowering the private cost of education) must be conducted together. However,
the former policies should be executed with great care, because they have negative e®ects on the
unskilled wage, transfers by unskilled workers, and thus the upward mobility of their descendants.
5Larson and Mundlak (1997) ¯nds that the ratio of average labor productivity of agricultural workers to that
of non-agricultural workers converges to one as an economy develops. Some evidence indicates that the size of the
informal sector and the wage di®erential between the informal and formal sectors decrease with development through
human capital accumulation (Marcouiller et al., 1997; Ranis and Stewart, 1999).
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The priority between the two kinds of policies depends on the productivity level and the stage of
development.
Empirical ¯ndings largely support the model's implications. The ¯rst point of the paper, the
importance of initial wealth distribution, especially the initial size of 'middle class', in economic
development, through its e®ect on human capital accumulation, has been backed by many studies.
Using panel data of wider coverage and of higher quality than those of earlier studies, Deininger
and Squire (1998) and Deininger and Olinto (2000) discover that an economy's growth rate is
a®ected negatively by initial land inequality (a proxy for initial asset inequality) and positively by
its mean years of schooling per working person (a proxy for human capital).6 Further, they ¯nd
that the average educational attainment is negatively a®ected by initial land inequality, the e®ect
of human capital is greater in a lower-income economy, and initial land and income inequality a®ect
negatively the income growth of the poor, but not of the rich. Using cross-sectional data from the
1960s to the 1990s, Easterly (2001) ¯nds that a larger size of 'middle class', measured as the share
of income held by the second through fourth quintiles of the distribution, is associated with more
education, especially at the secondary level, higher income, and higher growth.
The second point of the paper, su±cient productivity in the traditional sector as a precondition
for a successful sectoral shift, has not been formally tested, although there are several ¯ndings
indirectly supporting the claim. Bairoch (1975) points out the large gap (about 45 percent) in
agricultural productivity on average between European countries at the onset of their industrial
revolutions and Africa and Asia in the 1960s. Further, Hayami and Ruttan (1985) ¯nds a close
positive association between overall output growth and agricultural productivity growth for Sub-
Saharan African nations.
This paper is mainly related to two strands of literature. One is the literature that investigates
mechanisms and consequences of structural change. Matsuyama (1992) investigates the role of
agricultural productivity in economic development using a two-sector endogenous growth model and
shows how the openness of markets a®ects the relationship between productivity and growth. Using
a neoclassical growth model with multiple consumption goods and non-homothetic preferences,
Echevarria (1997) numerically shows that uneven productivity growth among sectors can lead to
di®erent aggregate growth rates at di®erent stages of development. Kongsamut et al. (2001) and
Ngai and Pissarides (2004) study multi-sector growth models related to the one investigated by
Echevarria and derive conditions for structural change and balanced growth. Laitner (2000) explains
how an economy's measured average propensity to save rises in the course of industrialization by
focusing on the increasing importance of reproducible capital relative to land. Wang and Xie (2004)
6Unless aggregate wealth accumulation is very low, a more equal wealth distribution implies that a larger propor-
tion of individuals can a®ord education.
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examine factors a®ecting the activation of a modern industry based on a static two-sector model
with non-homothetic preferences and uncompensated spillovers in the IRS modern sector. These
papers as well as the present paper focus on sectoral shifts in the modern growth era. By contrast,
Hansen and Prescott (2002) are concerned with the transition from stagnation to modern economic
growth during past several hundred years in contemporary developed economies. Based on a
two-sector OLG model, they argue that the adoption of less land-intensive production technology
induced by productivity growth is the main driving force.
The other is the large literature that investigates the interplay between income distribution
and growth theoretically, which includes Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993),
Ljungqvist (1993), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Benabou (1996a, 1996b), Benhabib and Rustichini
(1996), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt (2000), and Galor and Moav (2004).
Most closely related is the paper by Galor and Zeira, which shows how credit constraint and
lumpy investment in human capital can create the interaction between initial distribution and long-
run output and inequality. They consider an economy composed of two sectors that are similar in
production technologies to the present paper but both produce the same tradable good. (Thus,
the sectoral shift of consumption is not considered.) In a version of the model with land as a
factor of production of the traditional sector,7 the unskilled wage and thus the upward mobility
of the poor depend on wealth distribution and the skilled wage, as in this paper. (They depend
on aggregate assets too in the present model.) However, the mechanism is di®erent. In the Galor
and Zeira model, what gives rise to the dependency is a decreasing marginal return to labor in the
traditional sector and the credit constraint that individuals can borrow to ¯nance education but at
a higher rate than the lending rate, which makes the number of borrowers and thus the number of
skilled workers a®ected by the return to education. In the present model, the dependency comes
from the endogenous relative price of the traditional good that re°ects both demand and supply
factors. Further, with the sectoral shift of consumption, resources available to skilled workers also
depend on the relative price. In terms of policy implications, the most contrasting would be e®ects
of policies improving access to education through transfers to the poor. In their model, irrespective
of the productivity level of the traditional sector, such policies are su±cient for an economy to
escape from the state of low output and high inequality. By contrast, in the present model with
the sectoral shift of consumption, when the productivity is low, such policies must be implemented
together with the productivity-enhancing policies.
Galor and Moav construct a one-sector OLG model related to that of Galor and Zeira, in order
to explain the transition of the main engine of growth from physical capital accumulation (in early
7Footnotes 11, 19, and 26 discuss a modi¯ed model where land is included as in the Galor and Zeira model.
Qualitative results are not a®ected by the modi¯cation.
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stages of the Industrial Revolution) to human capital accumulation (in the modern growth era).
Further, they show that the e®ect of inequality on growth turns from positive to negative with the
replacement of the prime source of growth.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model without the sectoral shift of
consumption. Section 3 derives and analyzes the model's dynamics and Section 4 presents and
interprets the results from the basic model. In Section 5, the sectoral shift of consumption is
introduced into the model and its e®ects on the results are examined. Further, policy implications
of the model are discussed. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Model
2.1 Individual decisions
Time is discrete and starts from 0. There is no uncertainty. The economy is composed of a
continuum of individuals who live for two periods.
2.1.1 Investment decisions
In childhood, an individual receives a transfer from her parent and allocates it for two investment
options, assets and education, in order to maximize future income.8 Education, which would
correspond roughly to secondary education in actual developing economies, is required to become
a skilled worker and enjoy higher earnings in adulthood. The investment is a discrete choice, i.e.
takes education or not, and incurs a ¯xed cost. Consider an individual who was born into lineage
i in period t ¡ 1, whose generation is called generation t. Her education costs et, and its gross
return is wH;t¡ wL;t in the next period, where wH;t and wL;t are skilled and unskilled wages in
period t, respectively. Assume that the education cost is the cost of hiring current skilled workers
as teachers and it is proportional to wH;t¡1, i.e. et = sewH;t¡1, where se is a constant.9 The
investment must be self-¯nanced because loan markets for such investment are not available: the
child's future income is not a valid collateral in the ¯nancially underdeveloped economy. The other
option, the investment in assets, is a continuous choice, and brings a gross rate of return of 1 + rt.
It is easily shown that, in an equilibrium, the return from the educational investment becomes at
least as high as the return from the investment in assets, i.e. wH;t¡ wL;t ¸ (1 + rt)et.
8Alternatively, one can suppose that the investment decisions are carried out by the parent in order to maximize the
child's future income. Note that the transfer in the model corresponds to total intergenerational transfers including
bequests, education, and other inter-vivos transfers in real life. The decision that the child (or the parent) has to
make is the allocation of the whole transfers between education and assets.
9Kendrick (1976) ¯nds that teacher and student time constitute about 90% of all costs of education. Further,
World Bank (1983) notes that about 95% of current expenses in primary school systems of low income countries are
teacher salaries. In addition to direct costs of education, foregone earnings are important costs particularly in a low
income economy. Results are not a®ected by the inclusion of foregone earnings to the cost.
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Suppose that the individual has received bit units of income as a transfer from the parent. If the
return from the investment in education is strictly higher than that from the investment in assets,
optimal investment choices of assets ait and education e
i
t are given by the following equations:
10
If bit < et; a
i
t = b
i
t; e
i
t = 0; (1)
and if bit ¸ et; ait = bit ¡ et; eit = et: (2)
Since innate abilities of individuals are identical, transfers solely determine the investment and
resulting occupational choices.
2.1.2 Consumption and transfer decisions
An adult individual, who is either a skilled or unskilled worker depending on the human capital
investment in the previous period, obtains income from assets and labor supply and spends the
income on consumption and transfer to her child. Each adult is assumed to have a single child.
There are two di®erent consumption goods, good L and good H. Characteristics of the goods are
described later in this section. Assume that an adult individual of lineage i in generation t has the
following utility function:
U it = (c
i
L;t)
°l(ciH;t)
°h(bit+1)
1¡°l¡°h ; (3)
where ciL;t and c
i
H;t are her consumption of good L and good H, respectively and b
i
t+1 is the transfer
to the child (generation t + 1). Denote the relative price of good L to good H in period t by Pt:
Then, the budget constraint is (wit is her earnings)
Ptc
i
L;t + c
i
H;t + b
i
t+1 = w
i
t + (1 + rt)a
i
t: (4)
Maximization of (3) subject to (4) gives the following consumption and transfer rules:
Ptc
i
L;t = °l[w
i
t + (1 + rt)a
i
t]; (5)
ciH;t = °h[w
i
t + (1 + rt)a
i
t]; (6)
and bit+1 = (1¡ °l ¡ °h)[wit + (1 + rt)ait]: (7)
10Actually, the relative return from education is determined as the result of people's investment decisions, since
it depends on the numbers of skilled and unskilled workers in the economy. More formal analysis of the investment
decision is described in the next section.
7
2.1.3 Generational structure
At the beginning of period t + 1, current adults pass away, current children become adults, and
new children are born into the economy. Since each adult has one child, the population is constant
over time. The population of each generation is normalized to be one.
2.2 Production structure
There are two production sectors, sector L (the traditional sector) and sector H (the modern sector).
Sector L employs unskilled workers to produce good L, and sector H employs skilled workers and
physical capital to produce good H. Good H is used for investment in physical capital as well.
The production functions of the two sectors are given as follows:
Sector L: YL;t = AL;tLt; (8)
Sector H: YH;t = AH;t(HH;t)®(Kt)1¡®; 0 < ® < 1: (9)
In the above expressions, YL;t and YH;t are outputs of good L and good H, respectively, AL;t and
AH;t are productivity levels of the respective sectors, Lt is the number of unskilled workers, HH;t is
the number of skilled workers in sector H (the rest of skilled workers are employed in the education
sector), and Kt denotes physical capital.11 To focus on main mechanics of the model, in most parts
of the paper, the productivities AL;t and AH;t are assumed to be constant over time, i.e. AL;t = AL
and AH;t = AH . As described later, main results remain intact with the introduction of exogenous
productivity growth.
The assumptions that unskilled workers are employed only in sector L, and skilled workers and
physical capital are employed only in sector H are made for simplicity. Provided that the former
sector is more intensive in unskilled labor and the latter sector is more intensive in skilled labor,
the outcome from the model remains largely unchanged.
2.3 Market structure and determination of prices
Suppose that the markets for good L and for labor are closed domestically, while good H and
physical capital are freely mobile internationally. The assumptions on the ¯nal goods would be
better understood by associating them with goods in an actual economy.
The ¯rst interpretation is that good L is agricultural goods produced with traditional technology,
and good H is manufacturing and agricultural goods produced with modern technology. Traditional
11As mentioned in the introduction and explained in the next subsection, sector L corresponds to the urban informal
sector as well as traditional agriculture in a real economy, hence land is not included in the production function. If
land is a factor of production, the production function may be formulated as: YL;t = AL;t(Lt)
¯(Z)1¡¯ , 0 < ¯ < 1,
where Z is the ¯xed amount of land. E®ects of the inclusion of land on results are mentioned in footnotes 19 and 26.
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agriculture is engaged on a small scale by families located in rural areas and produces agricultural
goods largely for basic needs. Because its productivity is low and transportation costs and traders'
margins are high due to poor infrastructure and distribution system,12 it supplies the product
mostly for domestic markets. By contrast, modern manufacturing and commercial agriculture
compete more directly with foreign suppliers.
The second interpretation is that good L is non-tradable services and manufacturing goods
produced with technologies intensive in unskilled labor, such as petty trading, personal services,
and repairing services, and good H is manufacturing goods produced with technologies intensive in
skilled labor and physical capital. That is, sector L and sector H may be considered as the informal
and formal sectors of an urban economy, respectively. There is an evidence showing that the size
of the urban informal sector is substantial in most developing countries, in many cases accounting
for over half of the urban workforce (Ranis and Stewart, 1999).13
Perfect mobility of physical capital is assumed, because it is more realistic than the other
extreme of the closed market as a description of the situation of contemporary developing economies,
and it enables the paper to focus on human capital accumulation rather than physical capital
accumulation as the prime source of development.
From the assumptions, the interest rate is ¯xed at the world interest rate rt = r, which is
assumed to be time-invariant, and the skilled wage wH is given by the following equation.14
wH = ®(AH)
1
®
¡1¡ ®
r
¢ 1
®
¡1
: (10)
The wage rate is exogenous and constant over time. The wage of unskilled workers equals
wL;t = PtAL; (11)
hence it depends on the relative price of good L to good H, Pt:
12See, for example, Minten and Kyle (1999) for an evidence from former Zaire.
13Of course, in a real economy, there exist skill-intensive sectors that supply nontradable services and goods.
However, in lower developing countries, most of skill-intensive nontradables are public services, health services, and
education, where service prices and wages are determined more by institutional factors than by market conditions,
while nontradable sectors in°uenced more directly by market factors, such as ¯nancial services and consulting services,
are limited in size. By comparison, as explained in the main text, traditional agriculture and the urban informal sector
are important parts of unskilled-intensive sectors in developing countries. Hence, the assumption on the tradability
of the two ¯nal goods would be justi¯ed. Note that, as mentioned in the previous subsection, the assumption that
sector H employs only skilled labor and physical capital and sector L employs only unskilled workers can be relaxed
without a®ecting main results largely.
14From the ¯rst-order conditions of the pro¯t-maximizing problem of the ¯rm in sector H,
rt = (1¡ ®)AH
HH;t
Kt
®
;
and wH;t = ®AH
 Kt
HH;t
1¡®
:
Solving the ¯rst equation for
HH;t
Kt
, substituting it into the second equation, and setting rt = r gives (10).
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The relative price is determined by the market-clearing condition of good L. The demand for
good L is the total consumption of the good by the adult population, which is the sum of individual
consumption (5) over the population. So the market-clearing condition becomes
PtALLt = °l
h
wL;tLt + wHHt + (1 + r)
X
i
ait
i
: (12)
In the above equation, Ht is the total number of skilled workers, which is the sum of HH;t and HE;t
(the number of skilled workers in the education sector), and
P
i a
i
t is aggregate assets. Note that,
due to free international capital mobility, it could be the case that a large portion of the assets
are invested abroad, if there do not exist enough investment opportunities within the economy. By
substituting (11) and Ht + Lt = 1 into the above equation and solving for Pt; the relative price of
good L is given as follows:
Pt =
°l
1¡ °l
wHHt + (1 + r)
P
i a
i
t
AL(1¡Ht) : (13)
The relative price Pt increases with the number of skilled workers Ht and aggregate assets. Larger
Ht and
P
i a
i
t imply greater total income and higher demand of good L, and larger Ht (smaller Lt)
implies lower supply of the good, hence higher Pt. Since wL;t = PtAL, the unskilled wage is also
increasing in Ht and
P
i a
i
t:
For analyses in later sections, it is convenient to express the relative price as a function of Ht
and aggregate intergenerational transfers, Bt, by substituting
P
i a
i
t = Bt ¡ eHt into the above
equation (13):15
Pt =
°l
1¡ °l
[wH ¡ (1 + r)e]Ht + (1 + r)Bt
AL(1¡Ht) : (14)
The relative price and the unskilled wage are increasing in both Ht and Bt. To express the depen-
dency of Pt and wL;t on Ht and Bt, they are denoted as P (Ht; Bt) and wL(Ht; Bt); respectively.
The education sector employs skilled workers as teachers to provide educational services to
students. Since tuition equals e and the number of students is Ht+1 in period t, the market-clearing
condition is
wHHE;t = eHt+1; (15)
or HE;t = seHt+1: (16)
The above equation shows that the constant se represents the number of teachers needed to teach
one student. It is assumed that se < 1 is low enough that the above condition is satis¯ed without
15The relation
P
i a
i
t = Bt ¡ eHt is satis¯ed because current skilled workers have spent e on education out of their
received transfers in the previous period. Note that the cost of education is time-invariant because the skilled wage
wH is constant over time.
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rationing: otherwise, not all children who have enough wealth to pay tuition could receive education
because of a shortage of teachers.
3 Dynamics
In the model economy, individuals live only for two periods and participate in each market for one
period alone: each market consists of individuals of a single generation each period. Hence, the
model can be considered as a sequence of static economies.
What connects these static economies across periods are intergenerational transfers. Because
of the credit constraint, transfers directly a®ect individuals' investment and occupational choices,
and consequently consumption and transfer decisions. Further, the distribution of transfers over
the population determines the proportion of individuals who can a®ord to take education, and
thus it a®ects the relative return from education and investment decisions. Hence, in general, the
time evolution of the distribution of transfers must be examined in order to understand how the
economy's structure, such as production and employment shares of each sector, total output, and
wage and asset distributions, change over time.
This section ¯rst derives the dynamic equation linking the current period's transfer to the
next period's transfer within a lineage (individual dynamics). The dynamics depend on the time
evolution of two aggregate variables that in turn are determined by the dynamics of the distribution
of transfers. However, it turns out that, su±cient information for obtaining the model's implications
is the directions of motion of the aggregate variables, which can be derived without knowledge on
the distributional dynamics. Thus the dynamics of the two aggregate variables are examined next.
Although the two dynamics interact, for exposition, initially the dynamics of each variable are
analyzed ¯xing the other, then the both dynamics are analyzed together by introducing a phase
diagram.
3.1 Individual dynamics
Consider an individual born into lineage i in period t¡1, who belongs to generation t. She allocates
transfer bit between investments in assets a
i
t and in education e
i
t so as to maximize future income.
If the transfer is less than the cost of education, i.e. bit < e; the transfer is spent only on assets
and she becomes an unskilled worker, as described earlier. By contrast, if bit ¸ e is satis¯ed, the
investment decision is more complicated. Because investment decisions of others a®ect wL(Ht; Bt)
and the relative return from education, she has to take into account their actions. The key variable
a®ecting the decision is the fraction of individuals with bit ¸ e, Ft. In short, when only a small
number of individuals can a®ord education, all of them take education and become skilled, whereas,
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when many individuals have access to education, some of them become unskilled workers and the
wages (net of the cost of education) are equalized.
3.1.1 Unequal opportunity case
When the proportion of individuals who can a®ord to take education is small, the return from
education is higher than the return from assets, even if all of them take education, i.e. wH¡(1+r)e >
wL(Ft; Bt). In this case, the individual allocates the transfer in the following manner:
If bit < e; a
i
t = b
i
t; e
i
t = 0; (17)
and if bit ¸ e; ait = bit ¡ e; eit = e: (18)
Thus, all young individuals who are ¯nancially eligible for education become skilled workers, i.e.
Ht = Ft. Since transfers from parents constrain access to the pro¯table investment opportunity,
this case is called the unequal opportunity case.
In the next period, the individual, given asset ait and acquired ability (skilled or unskilled),
determines the amount of transfer to the child bit+1 according to (7). By substituting the above
investment rules into (7), the dynamic equation linking the received transfer bit to the transfer given
to the next generation bit+1 is derived.
If she is a skilled worker, i.e. bit ¸ e, the equation takes the following form:
bit+1 = bs(b
i
t) ´ (1¡ °l ¡ °h)fwH + (1 + r)(bit ¡ e)g: (19)
The assumption (1 ¡ °l ¡ °h)(1 + r) < 1 is made so that the ¯xed point of the equation (bs)¤ ´
1¡°l¡°h
1¡(1¡°l¡°h)(1+r) [wH ¡ (1 + r)e] is stable.
For an unskilled worker, i.e. bit < e, the equation becomes
bit+1 = bu(b
i
t;Ft; Bt) ´ (1¡ °l ¡ °h)fwL(Ft; Bt) + (1 + r)bitg; (20)
where wL(Ft; Bt) =
°l
1¡ °l
[wH ¡ (1 + r)e]Ft + (1 + r)Bt
(1¡ Ft) : (21)
The dynamic equation for an unskilled worker does depend on the aggregate variables Ht = Ft and
Bt, because they a®ect the relative price of good L and thus the unskilled wage. The ¯xed point
for given Ft and Bt is denoted by b¤u(Ft; Bt) ´ 1¡°l¡°h1¡(1¡°l¡°h)(1+r)wL(Ft; Bt).16
The dynamics of a current skilled worker, bit+1 = bs(b
i
t) and of a current unskilled worker, b
i
t+1 =
bu(bit;Ft; Bt), for given Ft and Bt are depicted in Figure 1.
17 As long as wH ¡ (1+ r)e > wL(Ft; Bt)
16This may not be the long-run transfer level of her lineage, because her descendants may become skilled workers
and Ft and Bt could change over time. One might think that this ¯xed point does not have any economic importance,
but it turns out that the level of b¤u(Ft; Bt) is crucial for aggregate dynamics (detailed later).
17To be more accurate, bit+1 = bs(b
i
t) is de¯ned only for b
i
t ¸ e and bit+1 = bu(bit) is only for bit < e. However,
12
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Figure 1: Individual dynamics of intergenerational transfers
is satis¯ed, bit+1 = bu(b
i
t;Ft; Bt) is located below b
i
t+1 = bs(b
i
t); but it shifts upward with increases
in Ft and Bt.
3.1.2 Equal opportunity case
Next, consider the case in which many individuals can a®ord education so that the return from
education fails to be higher than the return from assets, if all of them invest in education, i.e.
wH¡ (1+r)e · wL(Ft; Bt). In this situation, the number of skilled workers Ht is determined at the
point where the two returns are equated, i.e. wH¡ (1+r)e = wL(Ht; Bt). Now not all of ¯nancially
eligible individuals take education and become skilled workers, i.e. Ht · Ft. Since the return from
the investments does not depend on transfers from parents, this case is named the equal opportunity
case. Dynamics of transfers of the both types of workers are described by bit+1 = bs(b
i
t), (19). In
Figure 1, this is the situation where P (Ht; Bt) is high enough that bit+1 = bu(b
i
t;Ht; Bt) coincides
with bit+1 = bs(b
i
t).
3.1.3 Dividing line
The economy belongs to either of the two cases depending on Ft and Bt. The combination of Ft
and Bt satisfying wH ¡ (1+ r)e = wL(Ft; Bt) is the dividing line, which is obtained by substituting
Pt = [wH ¡ (1 + r)e]=AL,
P
i a
i
t = Bt ¡ eHt, and Ht = Ft into (13) and solving for Ft:
Ft = He(Bt) ´ (1¡ °l)¡ °l(1 + r)Bt
wH ¡ (1 + r)e: (22)
since the location of e relative to b¤u(Ft; Bt) depends on Ft and Bt, e is not shown in the ¯gure. Precise dynamics of
individual transfers are illustrated later (Figures 2 and 3).
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The unequal opportunity case corresponds to Ft < He(Bt), while the equal opportunity case
amounts to Ft ¸ He(Bt) = Ht:
3.2 Aggregate dynamics
What has become clear now is that the individual dynamics and the evolution of wages and the
relative price depend on the dynamics of two aggregate variables, aggregate transfers Bt and the
fraction of individuals satisfying bit ¸ e;Ft. Given the initial distribution of transfers, B0 and F0 are
determined directly, while levels of the aggregate variables in subsequent periods are determined
by the dynamics of the distribution of transfers. However, as mentioned earlier, information on
the direction of motion of the aggregate variables, which can be derived without knowledge on the
distributioal dynamics, is enough to obtain main implications of the model. Thus, this subsec-
tion analyzes the dynamics of Bt and Ft qualitatively. For exposition, each of them is examined
separately ¯xing the other variable ¯rst, then their interaction is taken into account at the end.
3.2.1 Dynamics of aggregate transfers
First, the dynamics of aggregate intergenerational transfers Bt are examined for given Ft. Consider
the unequal opportunity case, i.e. Ft < He(Bt). As seen in the previous subsection, wH¡(1+r)e >
wL(Ht; Bt) and Ht = Ft hold in this case. The dynamic equation of aggregate transfers is
Bt+1 = B(Ft; Bt) ´ 1¡ °l ¡ °h1¡ °l f[wH ¡ (1 + r)e]Ft + (1 + r)Btg; (23)
which is derived by aggregating individual dynamics of skilled (19) and of unskilled workers (20)
over the population and substituting Ht = Ft. The assumption 1¡°l¡°h1¡°l (1 + r) < 1 is made so that
there exists a ¯xed point that is globally stable for given Ft, where the ¯xed point B¤(Ft) equals
B¤(Ft) ´ 1
1¡ 1¡°l¡°h
1¡°l
(1+r)
1¡ °l ¡ °h
1¡ °l [wH ¡ (1 + r)e]Ft: (24)
Alternatively, in the equal opportunity case (Ft ¸ He(Bt)), wH ¡ (1 + r)e = wL(Ht; Bt); i.e.
Ht = He(Bt); holds. In this case, the dynamic equation is obtained by substituting Ht = He(Bt)
into Bt+1 = B(Ht; Bt):
Bt+1 = B(He(Bt); Bt) ´ (1¡ °l ¡ °h)f[wH ¡ (1 + r)e] + (1 + r)Btg: (25)
Note that the equation does not depend on Ft. The ¯xed point of the equation B¤¤ is
B¤¤ = 1¡°l¡°h1¡(1¡°l¡°h)(1+r) [wH ¡ (1 + r)e]; (26)
14
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Figure 2: Unequal opportunity case when b¤u(Ft; Bt) · e
which is equal to (bs)¤ and globally stable. And the number of skilled workers at B¤¤; H¤¤ ´
He(B¤¤), equals
H¤¤ ´ He(B¤¤) = (1¡ °l)¡ °l(1 + r)B
¤¤
[wH ¡ (1 + r)e] ;
= 1¡ °l
1¡ (1¡ °l ¡ °h)(1 + r) : (27)
3.2.2 Dynamics of Ft
Next, the dynamics of Ft, the proportion of people who can a®ord education, are examined for
given Bt. Unlike aggregate transfers, the dynamic equation relating Ft to Ft+1 depends on the
distribution of transfers over the population, so it cannot be derived without complete information
on the distribution. However, the direction of change of Ft can be known only with current values
of the two aggregate variables, Bt and Ft.
Assume that (1¡°l¡°h)wH ¸ e, i.e. B¤¤ = b¤s ¸ e; is satis¯ed. Note that this assumption places
a restriction not on the productivity of sector H but on the degree of altruism. Since e = sewH ,
it can be rewritten as 1 ¡ °l ¡ °h ¸ se, which implies that people are altruistic enough towards
their children. From the assumption, Ft is non-decreasing over time, because bit+1 ¸ e is satis¯ed
whenever bit ¸ e is true (see Figure 2).
First, consider the unequal opportunity case, in which transfers of unskilled workers change
over time according to bit+1 = bu(b
i
t;Ft; Bt). Whether Ft remains constant or increases over time
is determined by the relative size of b¤u(Ft; Bt) to e. When b
¤
u(:) · e, none of o®spring of unskilled
workers receive transfers greater than e (bit < e implies b
i
t+1 < e), so Ft is constant (see Figure 2).
In contrast, when b¤u(:) > e is satis¯ed, Ft+1 ¸ Ft holds, because, depending on the distribution of
transfers, education may become a®ordable to children of a portion of unskilled workers (see Figure
15
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Figure 3: Unequal opportunity case when b¤u(Ft; Bt) > e
3). And Ft de¯nitely increases in the longer term, when b¤u(:) > e continues to hold for su±ciently
many periods. From (21), the dividing line b¤u(Ft; Bt) = e is given by
Bt =
1¡ (1¡ °l ¡ °h)(1 + r)
(1¡ °l ¡ °h)(1 + r)
1¡ °l
°l
e(1¡ Ft)¡ [wH ¡ (1 + r)e]Ft1 + r : (28)
Alternatively, in the equal opportunity case, transfers of the both types of workers follow bit+1 =
bs(bit), and Ft+1 ¸ Ft is satis¯ed.
3.2.3 Joint dynamics of Ft and Bt
Finally, the dynamics of Ft and Bt are analyzed together by introducing the phase diagram (Figure
4), in which the horizontal axis represents F and the vertical axis represents B.18;19 Feasible
combinations of F and B are equal to the area bound by F = 0; F = 1; and B = eF : The economy
must satisfy B ¸ eF , because F is de¯ned as the fraction of individuals who have received transfers
bi greater than the cost of education e.
The diagram is divided into two regions, one corresponding to the unequal opportunity case
and the other region for the equal opportunity case (dotted area), by F = He(B), (22). The
region below the locus is the unequal opportunity case, where all the individuals who can a®ord
education take education and become skilled workers, i.e. H = F : The region above it is the equal
opportunity case, in which the number of skilled workers is determined so that the return from
18A more formal analysis of the dynamics of the aggregate variables is available from the author upon request.
19Even when sector L is interpreted as traditional agriculture and thus land is included in the production function
(see footnote 11), the qualitatively same phase diagram can be drawn and thus all the qualitative results in this
section remain intact. In particular, when agricultural output is shared equally among unskilled workers (and thus
the sector's valued added equals total unskilled labor income), the phase diagram is identical to the diagram of the
original model. When the unskilled wage and the rental rate of land are determined competitively, intercepts and
slopes of the lines in the diagram change slightly, but the shape of the diagram is not a®ected.
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Figure 4: Phase diagram
education is equated with the return from assets, i.e. H = He(B) · F .
In the unequal opportunity case, the direction of motion of B is determined by the position of
current (Ft; Bt) relative to B = B¤(F ), (24). When the current economy is located on the line, Bt
is constant; when located above (below), it decreases (increases) over time. The direction of change
of B in each region is expressed with vertical arrows. As for the direction of change of F = H,
it is determined by the location of (Ft; Bt) relative to b¤u(F ; B) = e. In the region below or on
the line (the area with vertical dashed lines), b¤u(:) · e is satis¯ed, accordingly Ft+1 = Ft holds;
in the region above the line (the area with horizontal dashed lines), b¤u(:) > e, hence Ft+1 ¸ Ft is
satis¯ed (and Ft increases in the longer term, if the economy stays in the region for su±ciently many
periods). Alternatively, in the equal opportunity case, the direction of motion of B is determined
by the relative location to B = B¤¤, (26), and Ft+1 ¸ Ft always holds.
With this diagram, qualitative properties of transitional dynamics and the long-run outcome
of the aggregate variables (F ; B) are transparent. Except when B > B¤(F ), b¤u(F ; B) > e, and
F < H¤¤ are simultaneously satis¯ed, they are completely known only with the position of (Ft; Bt)
in the diagram.
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4 Analyses
4.1 Initial distribution and long-run economic structure
By using this diagram, the relationship between the initial distribution of wealth and the long-run
structure of the economy along with its transition can be easily investigated.
First, consider an economy that attains equal opportunity from the beginning, whose initial
position is in the dotted area of the diagram. Since returns from the two investment opportunities
are equated, the both types of workers earn the same level of earnings (net of the cost of education),
and education becomes a®ordable to children of poor unskilled workers over time (F increases).
As long as the economy starts with F0 > F y (F y is de¯ned as the value of F at the intersection of
b¤u(F ; B) = e and B = B
¤(F )), it converges to (F ; B) = (1; B¤¤) for certain, where not only the net
earnings but also net income and wealth are equalized and bi = b¤s holds. That is, perfect equality is
attained. The long-run outcome of the economy with F0 · F y, by contrast, depends on the exact
initial distribution. If wealth is highly concentrated in the rich, F would increase only slightly and
the economy may regress to the unequal opportunity case (crosses the line F = He(Bt)). Otherwise,
it would converge to (1; B¤¤).
Next, examine an economy that starts from the area with horizontal dashed lines. It does not
satisfy equal opportunity initially, but children of unskilled workers gain access to education over
time (F increases). Thus, the number of skilled workers increases and wage inequality between
skilled and unskilled workers diminishes. Associated with this change, production and employment
shares of sector H rise, while those of sector L fall. When F0 > F y, the economy attains equal
opportunity at some point and perfect equality is realized in the long run. On the other hand,
when F0 · F y, the long-run outcome depends on the exact initial distribution. If the distribution
is concentrated in the few rich, the number of skilled workers increases only slightly over time, and
it is possible that the economy crosses b¤u(:) = e:
The remaining scenario is that an economy starts from the area with vertical dashed lines, where
not only investment opportunities are unequal but also children of unskilled workers cannot access
education, i.e. b¤u(:) · e. Since the number of skilled workers is constant, the sectoral composition of
production and employment remains unchanged. In particular, if F0 · F y, the economy converges
to (F0; B¤(F0)), and unequal opportunity and inequality persist in the long run. If the economy
starts with F0 > F y, its long-run prospect is much brighter. While asset accumulation is low, poor
people cannot a®ord education and hence the number of skilled workers remains constant. But,
after a certain amount of asset accumulation, the economy transits to b¤u(:) > e and the sectoral
shift starts. In the long run, it attains equal opportunity and perfect equality.
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The analysis has shown that there is a clear-cut relationship between the initial distribution of
wealth and the attainment of the structural change and equal opportunity in the long run. That
is, if the initial distribution is such that the fraction of individuals who have enough resources
to take education is low, the economy remains stagnant. Thus, the initial size of 'middle class'
matters for development through sectoral change. Note that equal distribution does not always
lead to development: if initial aggregate wealth is very low, too equal wealth distribution implies
F0 · F y and results in stagnation. Further, if the economy starts below the critical level of asset
accumulation, B0 = F ye, it remains stagnant irrespective of the initial distribution.
When productivity growth is introduced into the model, all the variables except F grow over
time even in the long run, but the qualitatively same phase diagram can be drawn, after the non-
stationary variables are adjusted for the productivity growth of sector H. Hence, all the qualitative
results in this subsection remain unchanged.20 Without the productivity growth, the sectoral shift
is necessarily associated with a rise of the relative price of good L, but now the relative price may
decrease over time if the productivity growth of sector L is large enough.
4.2 Comparisons among long-run equilibria
There are two kinds of steady state equilibria, (Fss; Bss) = (1; B¤¤) and (F ; B¤(F )), where F · F y:
In the former equilibrium, the number of skilled workers is H¤¤, the skilled wage (net of the cost
of education) is equal to the unskilled wage, and all individuals hold the same level of wealth,
1
1¡°l¡°h (bs)
¤.21 On the other hand, in the latter type of equilibria, the number of skilled workers is
F (· F y < H¤¤), the (net) skilled wage is higher than the unskilled wage, and the wealth of skilled
workers, 11¡°l¡°h (bs)
¤, is greater than that of unskilled workers, 11¡°l¡°h b
¤
u(F ; B¤(F )). The relative
price of good L, P (H ; B¤(H )), is increasing in H; so are wL(H ; B¤(H )) and b¤u(H ; B¤(H )):
These steady state equilibria can be ranked in terms of the wage and wealth of unskilled workers,
which may be also interpreted as measures of inequality between skilled and unskilled workers,22
and of the total wealth of the economy.23 The best equilibrium is (1; B¤¤), then among equilibria
(F ; B¤(F )); F · F y, one with larger F is better. The ranking, however, does not take into account
20 The detailed analysis is available from the author upon request. One thing to note is that both H¤¤ and F y
increase with the growth rate of sector H productivity. That is, with the faster productivity growth, the number of
skilled workers and thus the size of sector H become greater in the equal opportunity steady state, but it becomes
more di±cult for an economy with a small size of 'middle class' to initiate the sectoral shift. Thus, the productivity
growth of the modern sector enhances the disparity of the long-run outcome among economies with di®erent initial
conditions.
21Wealth is de¯ned as wH ¡ (1 + r)e+ (1 + r)(bs)¤.
22Remember that the wage and wealth of skilled workers are same in all the steady state equilibria. Interestingly,
Deininger and Squire (1998) ¯nds that initial land and income inequality a®ect negatively income growth of the poor,
but not of the rich.
23Total wealth at equilibrium (1; B¤¤) equals 1
1¡°l¡°h (bs)
¤, while at equilibria (F ; B¤(F )), F < F y, it is equal to
1
1¡°l¡°h (bs)
¤ F
H¤¤ .
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the fact that the relative price of good L is di®erent across the equilibria. For accurate welfare
comparisons, the utility of each type of workers needs to be computed. Still, the ordering among
the steady state equilibria remains unchanged, if the average utility, which can be interpreted as
the expected utility of an individual before birth, is used for the comparison.24
4.3 Mechanism behind the results
The mechanism of the model yielding the above results can be explained intuitively by the following
illustration (see Figure 4). Consider an economy in which skilled workers are scarce (H0 = F0 <
H¤¤) and its asset accumulation is modest (B0 < B¤(H0)) initially. How can this economy raise
its income level? One route is through further asset accumulation. Many individuals leave more
than they received from parents to children. The growth of wealth raises the demand for good
L, its price, and the unskilled wage. The increased unskilled wage then stimulates savings by
unskilled workers, further promoting asset accumulation. This process continues until aggregate
assets reach the steady state level. However, with the number of skilled workers constant, the
income growth is moderate since the ultimate source of asset accumulation is labor income. Further,
inequality between skilled and unskilled workers remains large because the investment opportunities
are constrained by family income.
Thus, in order to attain large income growth, an increase in the number of skilled workers
and the sectoral shift of production and employment from sector L to sector H is crucial. The
sectoral shift starts i® a fraction of children of unskilled workers receive enough resources to take
education, which is possible when the unskilled wage wL;t = PtAL and thus the relative price of
good L are above critical levels. The relative price depends positively on the number of skilled
workers and aggregate assets: the demand for good L increases with the both variables, while its
supply decreases with the number of skilled workers. Hence the two variables must be above certain
24At equilibrium (1; B¤¤), the both types of workers have the same utility level:
U(1; B¤¤) =
°
°l
l
°
°h
h
(1¡°l¡°h)1¡°l¡°h
1¡(1¡°l¡°h)(1+r) (AL)
°l [wH ¡ (1 + r)e]1¡°l : (29)
At equilibria (F ; B¤(F )), F · F y, the utility of skilled workers is given by
Us(F ; B
¤(F )) = U(1; B¤¤) ¢  1¡H¤¤
H¤¤
F
1¡ F
¡°l : (30)
Us(F ; B
¤(F )) > U(1; B¤¤) is satis¯ed since F < H¤¤. Intuitively, their utility level is higher than at equilibrium
(1; B¤¤) because good L is cheaper. In contrast, unskilled workers have lower utilities than at (1; B¤¤) :
Uu(F ; B
¤(F )) = U(1; B¤¤) ¢  1¡H¤¤
H¤¤
F
1¡ F
1¡°l : (31)
Note that Us(F ; B
¤(F )) is decreasing and Uu(F ; B
¤(F )) is increasing in F ; so inequality in welfare decreases with F .
Finally, the average utility is given by
E[U(H;B¤(H ))] = U(1; B¤¤) ¢   H
H¤¤
1¡°l  1¡H
1¡H¤¤
°l ; (32)
which is increasing in H and attains the highest value at H = H¤¤, since H · H¤¤ < 1¡ °l.
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levels for the 'take-o®', i.e. b¤u(F ; B) > e.
When the economy begins with an asset distribution satisfying F0 > F y, the relative price
of good L and the unskilled wage are not very low. If the combination of F0 and B0 satis¯es
b¤u(F0; B0) > e, a wealthier portion of unskilled workers can send their children to school and the
sectoral shift starts immediately. Otherwise, children of unskilled workers cannot access education
initially. However, after continued asset accumulation, the relative price reaches the critical level at
some point and the economy 'take o®s'. Once the sectoral shift starts, it continues autonomously.
An increase in the number of skilled workers and the resulting asset accumulation raise the demand
for good L, reduces its supply, and contributes to further rises in the relative price and the un-
skilled wage. Accordingly, children of less a²uent unskilled workers gain access to education and
the number of skilled workers grows further. This virtuous cycle continues, as long as the skilled
wage (net of the cost of education) is higher than the unskilled wage and thus ¯nancially eligible
individuals always take education and become skilled workers. The wage di®erential decreases over
time, however, and the virtuous cycle ends when the net wages are equated.25 After equal oppor-
tunity is attained, the unskilled wage stays constant, but the size of 'middle class' and aggregate
transfers continue to increase until they reach the steady state levels, (Fss; Bss) = (1; B¤¤).
In contrast, when the economy starts with a wealth distribution satisfying F0 · F y, the initial
number of skilled workers is small and the unskilled wage is low. Children of unskilled workers
are not ¯nancially eligible for education and cannot become skilled workers. Still, the relative
wage increases over time through asset accumulation, but it never reaches the critical level for
the sectoral shift. With the number of skilled workers constant, inequality between skilled and
unskilled workers does not disappear, and the economy ends up with equilibria with lower output
and unequal distribution, (Fss; Bss) = (F ; B¤(F )); F · F y.
When initial asset accumulation is relatively large for the number of skilled workers (B0 >
B¤(H0)), the relative price of good L and the unskilled wage are higher and thus the sectoral shift
starts more easily. However, unless F0 > F y, the convergence to the best steady state is not assured.
The reason is that the ultimate source of asset accumulation is labor income. Since initial asset
accumulation exceeds the level that labor income can support in the long run, there is a tendency
for wealth to decrease over time. If initial wealth is concentrated in the few rich and the number
of skilled workers increases only moderately, wealth does decrease over time and the economy ends
up in an unequal steady state.
25Psacharopoulos (1989, 1994) ¯nd that returns to education are higher in low-income nations especially at primary
and secondary education levels.
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5 Introducing the sectoral shift of consumption
The analysis so far has employed the Cobb-Douglas utility function, and hence has abstracted from
the sectoral shift of consumption from the traditional sector (sector L) to the modern sector (sector
H). It is a stylized fact that consumers spend more of their incomes on skill-intensive goods and
transfers as their income levels go up (see, for example, Syrquin, 1988, for the evidence). In this
section, the utility function is modi¯ed so that this feature can be observed in the model. After the
modi¯cation, the productivity of sector L as well as initial wealth distribution become determinants
of the long-run structure of the economy. In particular, it is shown that if the productivity of sector
L is su±ciently low, it ends up in a steady state with low output and high inequality regardless of
the initial distribution and the productivity of the modern sector.
5.1 Model
The modi¯ed utility function takes the following form:
U it = (c
i
L;t ¡ ecL)°l(ciH;t)°h(bit+1)1¡°l¡°h : (33)
The constant ecL may be interpreted as the minimum consumption level of good L needed for
subsistence, when good L is interpreted as basic agricultural goods. A consumer maximizes the
new utility subject to the budget constraint,
Ptc
i
L;t + c
i
H;t + b
i
t+1 = w
i
t + (1 + r)a
i
t; (34)
where wit is earnings and a
i
t is the investment in assets made in the previous period (childhood).
By solving the maximization problem, the following consumption and transfer rules are ob-
tained:
Ptc
i
L;t = °l[w
i
t + (1 + r)a
i
t] + (1¡ °l)Pt ecL; (35)
ciH;t = °h[w
i
t + (1 + r)a
i
t ¡ Pt ecL]; (36)
and bit+1 = (1¡ °l ¡ °h)[wit + (1 + r)ait ¡ Pt ecL]: (37)
The consumer ¯rst spends the wealth wit + (1 + r)a
i
t to purchase the minimum level of good L,ecL, then allocates the rest of the wealth to the goods and transfer in ¯xed proportions. As income
grows, the share of the wealth spent on good L falls and the shares spent on good H and the transfer
rise, unless Pt grows faster than the wealth. The price elasticity of good L is less than one, while
those of good H and the transfer are more than one.
Sectoral productivities are assumed to be time-invariant except in Section 5.5. Since the market
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structure is the same as before, the wages of skilled and unskilled workers are given by the same
equations, wH = ®(AH)
1
®
¡
1¡®
r
¢ 1
®
¡1 and wL;t = PtAL.
The market clearing condition of good L is di®erent from the one in the previous model because
of the term associated with ecL:
PtALLt = °l
h
wL;tLt + wHHt + (1 + r)
X
i
ait
i
+ (1¡ °l)Pt ecL: (38)
Remember that Lt is the number of unskilled workers, Ht is the number of skilled workers, andP
i a
i
t is aggregate assets. Substituting wL;t = PtAL, Lt = 1¡Ht; and
P
i a
i
t = Bt ¡ eHt into the
above equation, and solving it for Pt, the relative price of good L is given by
Pt = P (Ht; Bt) ´ °l1¡ °l
[wH ¡ (1 + r)e]Ht + (1 + r)Bt
AL(1¡Ht)¡ ecL : (39)
It is assumed that the productivity of sector L is high enough (AL > ecL) that the economy can
support at least the minimum level of consumption ecL, if the whole population is in sector L. With
the presence of ecL, higher productivity AL lowers Pt more than proportionately, because people
spend smaller portions of their incomes on good L.
Derivations of dynamic equations of individual and aggregate transfers are explained in Ap-
pendix. Here, major properties of the equations and of variables needed to analyze the joint dynam-
ics of Ft and Bt are summarized. In the unequal opportunity case, i.e. wH ¡ (1+ r)e > wL(Ft; Bt),
the dynamic equation of a skilled worker, bit+1 = bs(b
i
t;Ft; Bt), and its ¯xed point, b
¤
s(Ft; Bt), now
depend negatively on Ft and aggregate transfers Bt through Pt. Increases in Ft and Bt raise the
price of good L, forcing her to increase spending on the minimum level of consumption, ecL, and
reduce a transfer. By contrast, the dynamic equation of an unskilled worker and its ¯xed point,
b¤u(Ft; Bt), depend positively on Ft and Bt through Pt, because the e®ect of Pt on her wage exceeds
the e®ect on the expenditure on ecL. In the equal opportunity case, i.e. wH ¡ (1+ r)e · wL(Ft; Bt),
the dynamic equation and its ¯xed point, b¤, are independent of Ft and Bt, and the dividing line
between the two cases, Ft = He(Bt), decreases with Bt, as in the previous model. The dynamic
equation of Bt in the unequal opportunity case is same as before and its ¯xed point, B¤(Ft), in-
creases with Ft. In the equal opportunity case, the ¯xed point of the dynamics, B¤¤, equals b¤ and
the number of skilled workers at B¤¤ is denoted H¤¤. As seen below, unlike the model with ecL = 0,
AL a®ects these variables (except B¤(Ft)) and thus the dynamics of Ft and Bt.
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Figure 5: Economy with the sectoral shift of consumption: low productivity in sector L
5.2 Joint dynamics of Ft and Bt
As before, the joint dynamics of Ft and Bt, and relationship between initial wealth distribution
and the long-run performance of an economy are investigated using a phase diagram.26
High productivity in sector L: When the productivity of sector L is high enough that AL[(1¡
°l ¡ °h)wH ¡ e] > (1¡ °l ¡ °h)[wH ¡ (1 + r)e] ecL, or AL(1¡ °l ¡ °h ¡ se) > (1¡ °l ¡ °h)[1¡ (1 + r)se] ecL, is
satis¯ed, the phase diagram looks like the one in Section 3 (Figure 4).27 The qualitative nature of
the dynamics remains unchanged in this case. That is, when the economy starts with a relatively
equal wealth distribution and su±cient aggregate wealth, it converges to the equal opportunity
steady state, i.e. (F ; B) = (1; B¤¤); when the economy begins with an unequal wealth distribution
or too small aggregate wealth, it converges to an unequal opportunity steady state, i.e. one of
(F ; B) = (F ; B¤(F )), F · F y.
Low productivity in sector L: By contrast, when AL(1¡°l¡°h¡se) < (1¡°l¡°h)[1¡(1+r)se] ecL
is satis¯ed, that is, when the productivity of sector L is low, the phase diagram looks like Figure 5.
26Unlike the model without the sectoral shift of consumption, when land is included in the production function of
sector L (see footnotes 11 and 19), the loci in the diagram except B = B¤¤ and B = eF become nonlinear. However,
the phase diagram and thus the dynamics are qualitatively same as the original model. As seen just below, when the
productivity of sector L is high, the dynamics are as analyzed in the previous section, while, when the productivity
is low, the dynamics are as depicted in Figure 5 below. E®ects of land on results are similar to sector L productivity.
27There are two minor di®erences from the model withfcL = 0. First, F = He(B) shifts inwards by factor (1¡ fcLAL ):
Second, the slope of b¤u(F ; B) = e becomes steeper by the presence of (1¡ fcLAL ). See Appendix.
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Unlike the previous case, b¤u(F ; B) = e is located above F = H
e(B), hence b¤u(H;B) < e is satis¯ed
for all the feasible combinations of (H;B),28 while b¤s(F ; B) = e is located below F = H
e(B).29
Consequently, descendants of unskilled workers never accumulate enough assets to become skilled
workers. Since b¤s(F ; B) is decreasing in F and B, in the region above b
¤
s(F ; B) = e; b
¤
s(:) < e and
thus Ft+1 · Ft are satis¯ed, while in the region below or on the line, b¤s(:) ¸ e and Ft+1 = Ft hold.
In the diagram, F ¦ is the value of F at the intersection of b¤s(F ; B) = e and B = B
¤(F ).
Based on the diagram, relationship between initial wealth distribution and the long-run outcome
of an economy is examined. The most notable di®erence from the results of the previous case and
of the model with ecL = 0 is that equal opportunity and perfect equality are not sustained in
the long run. In the equal opportunity case (dotted area), b¤ < e holds and thus the proportion
of individuals ¯nancially quali¯ed for education decreases over time. Consequently, the economy
transits to the unequal opportunity case at some point. In the unequal opportunity case, as long
as the economy is located above b¤s(F ; B) = e; the number of skilled workers decreases over time.
Thus, the long-run equilibria of the economy are (F ; B) = (F ; B¤(F ));F · F ¦, where the (net)
skilled wage is higher than the unskilled wage and unequal opportunity persists. Among the steady
state equilibria, one with greater F achieves lower inequality and higher total income.
5.3 Analyses
With the introduction of the sectoral shift of consumption, the long-run outcome of the economy
becomes dependent on the productivity of sector L. Why doesn't the economy succeed in the
sectoral shift when the productivity of the traditional sector is low? The requirement for the
structural change is sizable wealth accumulation by a portion of unskilled workers so that they can
send their children to school. How does the lower productivity a®ect their transfers? Remember
that they have to consume at least ecL units of good L irrespective of its price, so the price elasticity
of demand for the good is less than one. Accordingly, when the productivity of sector L decreases,
the relative price of good L rises more than proportionately, thus the unskilled wage too goes up,
other things being equal. The higher wage allows unskilled workers to spend more on transfers,
while the price increase forces them to raise the expenditure on good L. It turns out that the former
e®ect dominates and transfers increase:30 with smaller F and B, a portion of children of unskilled
workers can achieve the upward mobility, i.e. b¤u(F ; B) = e is located closer to the origin in the
28The condition on the productivity is equivalent to b¤ < e. Thus, in the equal opportunity case, b¤u(H;B) =
b¤u(H
e(B); B) = b¤ < e is satis¯ed. Then, b¤u(H;B) < e is satis¯ed for the unequal opportunity case as well, since
b¤u(H;B) = b
¤
u(F ; B) < b
¤
u(H
e(B); B).
29This is equivalent to B¤¤ = b¤ < e: So B = eF intersects with B = B¤¤ at F < 1 in this case.
30Note that their utilities do not necessarily increase, because the higher price reduces the consumption of good L.
Only the very poor (those with little assets) are better o® for certain.
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phase diagram. However, there is the other e®ect associated with the lower productivity and the
resultant higher unskilled wage: because of the fall of return to education for given F and B, the
economy can sustain a smaller number of skilled workers under equal opportunity, i.e. F = He(B)
too is located closer to the origin. If the productivity of sector L is low enough, as in Figure 5,
the second e®ect dominates the ¯rst one, i.e. b¤u(F ; B) = e is located above F = H
e(B), thus the
sectoral shift never starts.
Further, when the economy starts with relatively large 'middle class', i.e. F0 > F ¦, it cannot
maintain the initial size of skilled labor, because the relative price of good L is too high for all
of skilled workers to leave transfers su±cient for education to their children. The number of
skilled workers must decline until the relative price falls enough that they can leave the adequate
transfers. In particular, the case where the economy starts with F0 > F ¦ and b¤s(F0; B0) > e (the
area with vertical dashed lines) is worth mentioning. As long as b¤s(F ; B) ¸ e is satis¯ed, wealth
accumulation (with constant H = F ) raises the relative price of good L and the unskilled wage
and lowers inequality between skilled and unskilled workers over time. However, once the economy
enters the region b¤s(F ; B) < e, H = F begins to decline, reversing the improving trend in the
unskilled wage and the inequality. The rising price of good L chokes o® the moderate development
process eventually.31
The result shows that, when the sectoral shift of consumption is introduced, a moderate level of
productivity in sector L becomes a prerequisite for the sectoral shift, and without it, the economy
is destined to converge to a steady state with low output and high inequality. By contrast, without
the sectoral shift of consumption, the structural change happens even when the productivity is low,
as long as initial wealth distribution is 'right'. In this case, individuals always spend a ¯xed portion
of their incomes on each of the goods and transfers, hence the productivity level does not a®ect
the unskilled wage and transfer levels.
5.4 Policy Implications
Several policy implications can be drawn from the results. When the productivity of the traditional
sector is low, policies intended to correct the distribution of wealth, including land redistribution
and increased income transfers to the poor, alone do not lead to the structural change and the
large improvement of income levels of the poor. For these policies to have greater impacts, policies
enhancing the sector's productivity, such as the improvement of agricultural infrastructure and
the better provision of governmental services to the urban informal sector, must be implemented
31Relatedly, the possibility that a rising food price produced in the traditional sector could sti°e development
process is shown in the Lewis (1954) model of a dual economy. The mechanism is that a wage increase caused by a
rising food price reduces pro¯ts of the modern sector, lowers savings by capitalists and thus capital accumulation.
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simultaneously.32 Aid from foreign countries and international institutions would be much more
e®ective, if it is allocated, for example, not only to school building projects in rural areas that
help reducing the private cost of education, but also to the di®usion of knowledge on better farm
practices.33
Policies contributing to the higher productivity of the traditional sector, however, must be
executed with great care. Without the sectoral shift of consumption, the higher productivity lowers
the relative price of the traditional good, while it does not a®ect the wages and all the dynamic
equations, hence welfare e®ects of the policies on all workers of present and future generations
are de¯nitely positive. With ecL > 0, in the unequal opportunity case, such policies lower the
unskilled wage as well as the price, hence they have negative e®ects on the wage inequality and
transfers by unskilled workers. Skilled workers bene¯t from the lower price, while descendants of
unskilled workers su®er from lower wealth and their upward mobility may be halted.34 Hence,
when sector L productivity is low (so that the phase diagram looks like Figure 5), for the structural
change to be realized, the both types of policies must be carried out, unless Ft is high enough.
In the equal opportunity case, the higher productivity increases the welfare of all individuals,
because it lowers the relative price and raises the number of skilled workers and asset accumulation.
Thus, the productivity-enhancing policies are desirable even when the productivity is high (Figure
4). However, in this case, policies mitigating wealth inequality (or lowering the private cost of
education) should be given a higher priority at an early stage of development.35
By contrast, policies raising the modern sector (sector H) productivity increase steady state
aggregate assets (without a®ecting the number of skilled workers in the equal opportunity steady
state). However, they may hinder the upward mobility of descendants of unskilled workers in
the high productivity case (lowers F y), because they increase the skilled wage and the cost of
education at a higher rate than the unskilled wage. In the low productivity case, the inequality
worsens without a®ecting the maximum number of skilled workers sustainable in the long run, F ¦.
32By contrast, as mentioned in the introductory section, in the model of Galor and Zeira (1993), the inequality-
correcting policies are su±cient for the attainment of equal opportunity.
33Unlike the redistributive policies, policies lowering the private cost of education, e, not only increase Ft but also
make the critical condition for the sectoral shift, AL[(1¡°l¡°h)wH ¡ e] > (1¡°l¡°h)[wH ¡ (1+ r)e]fcL, more likely
to be satis¯ed. However, because AL and e enter multiplicatively in the condition, the e®ectiveness of the policies
would be much greater if policies raising AL are executed at the same time.
34Note that aggregate wealth accumulation is not a®ected by the productivity (see equation 47 of Appendix). As
for present unskilled workers, welfare e®ects of the policies are ambiguous, because the unskilled wage is lower but
the traditional good is cheaper. A richer portion of unskilled workers is more likely to bene¯t.
35What should be avoided is that, as a result of the productivity-enhancing policies, an economy whose initial
distribution has been conductive to the long-run attainment of equal opportunity ends up in an unequal opportunity
steady state. In such economy, these policies should be conducted after the other policies ensure the convergence
to the best steady state. By contrast, in the model of Galor and Zeira (1993), the higher productivity does not
have any welfare e®ects in the equal opportunity case (just lowers the number of skilled workers), while, in the
unequal opportunity case, it raises the unskilled wage and could improve the long-run outcome drastically and thus
the productivity-improving policies are always bene¯cial.
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Hence, unless F0 is su±ciently high, such policies should not be conducted on a large scale at a
earlier stage of development.36
Finally, based on the policy implications, China's economic and education policies from the
late 1970s are evaluated. When the Chinese government initiated economic reforms, China was a
poor economy that was largely dependent on unproductive agriculture in rural areas. One of the
¯rst reforms tackled the sector's low productivity: the basic unit of production was transformed
from a commune to a family farm and agricultural markets were partially liberalized. The purpose
was to stimulate suppliers' incentives to raise productivity. Largely as a result of the reform, the
growth of agricultural output accelerated in the early 1980s. As for the manufacturing sector,
the emphasis was placed on the growth of industries intensive in unskilled labor: non-state but
non-private Township-Village Enterprises (TVEs) in rural areas were permitted to enter industries
not related to agriculture and led the sector's growth until the early 1990s, while foreign direct
investment (FDI) was very limited during the period (Qian, 2003).37
The government started reforms in the education sector too. Educational expenditure was
increased signi¯cantly: during the years 1950-78, 6.50% of total government expenditure was allo-
cated to education on average, which amounted to 2.20% of national income, while, for the years
1979-92, the proportion increased to 11.01%, which was 2.88% of national income (Tsang, 2000). In
1985, it announced a major educational reform, including the achievement of nine-year compulsory
education by 2000.38
These policies are consistent with the model's implications that, while the productivity of the
traditional sector is low, policies enhancing the sector's productivity and policies enabling greater
access to education should be implemented simultaneously, and productivity-enhancing policies to
the modern sector should be limited in size. China's continuing phenomenal growth may be partly
due to right choices of the policies at an early stage of transition to a market economy.
5.5 Productivity growth
The introduction of productivity growth does not largely change the main results of this section, but
unlike the economy without the sectoral shift of consumption, the phase diagram is not qualitatively
same as the constant productivity case. The reason is that, even after adjusted for the productivity
growth of sector H, F = He(B;AL;t); b¤s(F ; B;AL;t) = e; and b
¤
u(F ; B;AL;t) = e, shift upward with
36A similar implication is obtained in the Galor and Zeira (1993) model, when the cost of education is assumed to
be proportional to the skilled wage.
37The reform of state ¯rms, which dominated heavy industries, was initiated as early as 1978, but it was not
successful. The higher growth of industries intensive in unskilled labor may be partly due to the failure of the reform
and not intended by the government.
38Although education itself was publicly provided, the indirect cost such as a commuting cost and the opportunity
cost should have been important, considering, for example, urban-rural disparity in educational attainment.
28
the growth of AL;t. This complication brings some new phenomena to the dynamics.39
First, consider the case where the initial productivity of sector L is high so that the phase
diagram in the initial period looks like the one in Section 3 (Figure 4). When F0 is su±ciently
large or small, the dynamics of Ft and Bt are qualitatively same as the constant productivity case.
A new possibility arises when F0 is of an intermediate size. In this situation, an economy initially
experiencing sectoral shift may end up in an unequal opportunity steady state. This can happen
if wealth is relatively concentrated in the rich, consequently an increase in the number of skilled
workers cannot keep up with an outward shift of b¤u(F ; B;AL;t) = e resulting from the productivity
growth of sector L. Unskilled workers can increase transfers rapidly enough to keep up with a
rising cost of education, if their income growth or a fall of the price of good L are fast enough.
Given other things equal, the productivity growth makes the good cheaper but lowers the unskilled
wage.40 The net e®ect on their asset accumulation is negative, that is, the growth of their transfers
lag that of the cost of education. Hence, the sectoral shift is halted if the number of skilled workers
and aggregate assets do not increase rapidly enough to support the unskilled wage.
When the initial productivity of sector L is low, the phase diagram in the initial period looks
like the one presented earlier in this section (Figure 5). Clearly, due to the productivity growth, the
economy shifts to the high productivity case (Figure 4) at some point. However, it is very unlikely
that the economy starting from this situation succeeds in the sectoral shift and reaches the equal
opportunity steady state in the long run. If the economy enters the high productivity case with
small F , the structural change never starts. Entering the high productivity case with large F , on
the other hand, requires sizable initial 'middle class' and rapid productivity growth in sector L,
which is unlikely to be met in poor countries.41
6 Conclusion
There are two phenomena widely observed when an economy departs from an underdeveloped state
and starts rapid economic growth: shifts of production, employment, and consumption from the
traditional sector to the modern sector, and a large increase in educational levels of its population.
The question is why some economies have succeeded in such 'structural change', but others do not.
In order to examine the question, in particular, regarding contemporary developing economies, this
paper has constructed an OLG model that explicitly takes into account the sectoral change and
human capital accumulation as sources of development.
39The detailed analysis is available from the author upon request.
40The e®ects decrease with the productivity level and thus the model looks like the case of fcL = 0 in the long run.
41E®ects of the productivity growth of sector H are qualitatively same as the case of fcL = 0 (footnote 20) with one
additional result: when the initial productivity of sector L is low, the higher productivity growth is associated with
lower F ¦.
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It has been shown that, for a successful structural change, an economy must start with an initial
wealth distribution that enables a su±cient proportion of individuals to receive education. Once
the economy initiates the `take-o®', the sectoral shift and human capital growth continue until it
reaches the steady state where equal opportunity is attained. However, when the productivity of
the traditional sector is low, the economy does not succeed in the sectoral shift irrespective of the
initial distribution and modern sector productivity. Thus su±cient productivity in the traditional
sector is a prerequisite for successful development.
The main points of the paper, (i) the importance of initial wealth distribution, especially the
size of 'middle class', in economic development, and (ii) su±cient productivity in the traditional
sector as a precondition for a successful sectoral shift, are largely supported by empirical studies.
Supportive evidences on the second point are more indirect, and it may be worthwhile to test this
point in a more formal manner. One simple test would be a regression of an economy's output
growth on initial productivity in the traditional sector and other controls including an initial size of
'middle class'. The paper also shows that the priority of policies enhancing the productivity of the
traditional sector over those correcting wealth inequality (or lowering the private cost of education)
depends on the productivity level and the stage of development, which could be tested empirically.
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Appendix: Individual and aggregate dynamics of transfers of the model with the
sectoral shift of consumption
A.1 Individual dynamics
In the unequal opportunity case, i.e. wH ¡ (1 + r)e > wL(Ft; Bt), transfers of skilled workers are
governed by the following equation, which is obtained by substituting wit = wH , a
i
t = b
i
t ¡ e, and
Ht = Ft into (37):
bit+1 = bs(b
i
t;Ft; Bt) ´ (1¡ °l ¡ °h)f[wH ¡ (1 + r)e] + (1 + r)bit ¡ P (Ft; Bt) ecLg; (40)
which depends negatively on Ft and aggregate transfers Bt through Pt: The ¯xed point of the
equation for given P (Ft; Bt), b¤s(Ft; Bt), is equal to
b¤s(Ft; Bt) ´ 1¡°l¡°h1¡(1¡°l¡°h)(1+r)f[wH ¡ (1 + r)e]¡ P (Ft; Bt) ecLg: (41)
As for unskilled workers, the dynamics of transfers are governed by the following equation,
which is obtained by plugging wit = ALP (Ft; Bt), a
i
t = b
i
t, and Ht = Ft into (37):
bit+1 = b
i
u(b
i
t;Ft; Bt) ´ (1¡ °l ¡ °h)f(1 + r)bit + (AL ¡ ecL)P (Ft; Bt)g: (42)
The dynamic equation for unskilled workers depends positively on Ft and Bt through Pt. The ¯xed
point for given P (Ft; Bt), b¤u(Ft; Bt), equals
b¤u(Ft; Bt) ´ 1¡°l¡°h1¡(1¡°l¡°h)(1+r)(AL ¡ ecL)P (Ft; Bt): (43)
In the equal opportunity case, i.e. wH ¡ (1 + r)e · wL(Ft; Bt), transfers of the both types of
workers follow
bit+1 = b(b
i
t) ´ (1¡ °l ¡ °h)
©
(1 + r)bit + [wH ¡ (1 + r)e]
¡
1¡ ecL
AL
¢ª
: (44)
The equation is obtained from the substitution of P (Ht; Bt) = [wH ¡ (1 + r)e]=AL into (42). The
¯xed point of the equation, b¤, is
b¤ ´ 1¡°l¡°h1¡(1¡°l¡°h)(1+r) [wH ¡ (1 + r)e]
¡
1¡ ecL
AL
¢
: (45)
The dividing line between the two cases is obtained by substituting Pt = [wH ¡ (1 + r)e]=AL
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and Ht = Ft into (39) and solving the equation for Ft:
Ft = He(Bt) ´ (1¡ °l)
¡
1¡ ecL
AL
¢¡ °l(1 + r)Bt
[wH ¡ (1 + r)e] : (46)
A.2 Dynamics of aggregate transfers
In the unequal opportunity case, the dynamics of aggregate transfers Bt follow the same equation
as the model with ecL = 0:
Bt+1 = B(Ft; Bt) ´ 1¡ °l ¡ °h1¡ °l f[wH ¡ (1 + r)e]Ft + (1 + r)Btg: (47)
The ¯xed point of the equation for given Ft is equal to B¤(Ft) ´ [1¡ 1¡°l¡°h1¡°l (1+r)]¡1£
1¡°l¡°h
1¡°l [wH¡
(1 + r)e]Ft.
In the equal opportunity case, the dynamics are described by Bt+1 = B(He(Bt); Bt), which is
obtained by plugging Ht = He(Bt) into Bt = B(Ht; Bt):
Bt+1 = B(He(Bt); Bt) ´ (1¡ °l ¡ °h)
©
[wH ¡ (1 + r)e]
¡
1¡ ecL
AL
¢
+ (1 + r)Bt
ª
: (48)
The ¯xed point of the equation B¤¤ is given by
B¤¤ ´ 1¡°l¡°h1¡(1¡°l¡°h)(1+r) [wH ¡ (1 + r)e]
¡
1¡ ecL
AL
¢
; (49)
which is equal to b¤. The number of skilled workers at B¤¤, H¤¤ ´ H(B¤¤), is
H¤¤ ´ H(B¤¤) = £1¡ °l1¡(1¡°L¡°h)(1+r)¤¡1¡ ecLAL ¢: (50)
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